The Navy of the American Revolution — Reading Notes
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Read on Project GutenbergCharles Oscar Paullin's 1906 dissertation, The Navy of the American Revolution, deliberately shifts the historical lens from the deck to the desk. Where earlier narratives by Thomas Clark and James Fenimore Cooper emphasized sea fights and individual commanders, Paullin centers the administrative machinery: the committees, secretaries of marine, navy boards, and agents who directed naval affairs. He draws on sources not accessible to previous writers, offering a method that treats the navy as a bureaucratic organism rather than a series of dramatic incidents.
Administrative Machinery over Action
Paullin explicitly states his aim: to restore the naval administrative machinery of the Revolution. The preface contrasts his approach with earlier historians who wrote from the officers' viewpoint, producing accounts that lack unity, since they consist of a series of detached incidents. Instead, Paullin traces the origin, organization, and work of naval committees, secretaries of marine, navy boards, and naval agents. This focus on administration means the book examines how laws were prepared and executed, giving a fairly complete resume of the naval legislation of the Revolution. Privateering, though mentioned, is treated briefly because privateers were not part of the official navy. The result is a narrative centered on policy and logistics rather than combat.
Diplomatic and Legal Complexities Abroad
A substantial portion of the excerpts deals with the delicate work of American representatives in France. Paullin details how the Commissioners—Franklin, Deane, and Lee—managed naval affairs in a neutral country. In 1777, the Naval Office at Paris oversaw building and purchasing vessels, fitting out cruisers like the Reprisal and Lexington, and selling prizes. The task was most delicate because France had to maintain neutrality with England. The Commissioners sought permission for American ships to use French ports, and Arthur Lee made similar requests in Spain and Prussia, both of which refused. Paullin notes that the Americans generally overestimated the friendliness of France in 1776, failing to grasp the limits imposed by neutrality laws. This section reveals the tension between revolutionary ambition and diplomatic reality.
State Navies and Undocumented Sources
Paullin claims to provide the first account of the State Navies, a topic previously neglected. He also emphasizes his use of sources that earlier writers did not access, such as written orders from naval committees and navy boards. The excerpts show meticulous footnoting of diplomatic correspondence, including letters from Deane and Franklin. By focusing on administrative records, Paullin offers a perspective that complements—and corrects—the more popular narratives. His dissertation format, submitted for a PhD at the University of Chicago, lends a scholarly rigor that prioritizes evidence over storytelling.
The Challenge of Neutrality
One recurring tension is the conflict between American needs and European neutrality laws. Paullin documents how the Commissioners tried to establish American admiralty courts in France and the French West Indies, a move that would have violated French neutrality. The excerpts show that France could not grant such requests if she wished to remain at peace with England. This legal and diplomatic friction shaped every aspect of naval operations abroad, from fitting out ships to selling prizes. Paullin's treatment of these issues underscores the administrative and political hurdles that were as formidable as any naval battle.
Readers approaching Paullin's work should expect a methodical, source-driven analysis rather than a narrative of heroic exploits. The book rewards attention to its footnotes and legislative summaries, which reveal how the Continental Navy was built from committees and correspondence as much as from ships and cannon. For those interested in the bureaucratic foundations of American naval power, this study offers a foundational perspective that remains valuable for its archival grounding.
That rainy afternoon, Paullin’s book pulled me away from quarterdeck heroics into the quieter, cluttered rooms where the Continental Navy was actually run—ledgers, committees, frayed letters. It felt like watching someone sort through an attic. Afterwards, I drifted to a different war’s paperwork entirely, stumbling upon The History of Company A, Second Illinois Cavalry — A Reader’s Guide, and found the same patient, human texture waiting there.
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